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Formulating Excitation Policy Based on Asymmetric Information ——The Analysis of the Factors Analysis of Seller’s Moral Hazard Level(PDF)

《南京理工大学学报》(自然科学版)[ISSN:1005-9830/CN:32-1397/N]

Issue:
2000年02期
Page:
189-192
Research Field:
Publishing date:

Info

Title:
Formulating Excitation Policy Based on Asymmetric Information ——The Analysis of the Factors Analysis of Seller’s Moral Hazard Level
Author(s):
LiJinning ZhuZhengxuan WangHuixia LuanJie
School of Economics Management Mechanics,NUST,Nanjing 210094
Keywords:
informat ion asymmet ry ex citation moral hazard principal agent
PACS:
F718
DOI:
-
Abstract:
This paper ex pounded the imperfect ion when manag ers made the incentive plans for the sellers, applied the economy theory of asymmetric informat ion and the principa-l agent to analyze the employee. s moral hazard behavior, pointed out relationship between motive of moral hazard and reveal probability, ext ra probit and payment during employment and after being discused, and proposed the reasonable methods to incite the employees, w hich serves as basic approach for managers to make the effect ive incentive policy.

References:

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2 泰勒尔. 产业组织理论. 北京: 中国人民大学出版社, 1997
3 哈尔·瓦里安. 微观经济学. 北京: 经济科学出版社, 1997
4 王则柯. 信息经济学浅说. 北京: 经济科学出版社, 1999
5 张维迎. 博弈论与信息经济学. 上海: 三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 1996
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Memo

Memo:
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Last Update: 2013-03-25