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Allocation and pricing mechanism oriented to group-buying(PDF)


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Allocation and pricing mechanism oriented to group-buying
Jiang Yi1Wu Jing1Zhu Zeyu2Zhu Junwu13Li Bin14
1.School of Information Engineering,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China; 2.School of Computer and Information Engineering,Guangxi Teachers Education University,Nanning 530023,China; 3.School of Computer Science,University of Guelph,Guelph N1G2W1,Canada; 4.State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China
group-buying pricing function coalition pricing mechanism utility distribution
Buyers with different requirements can enhance their ability with sellers by forming a common-utility coalition in group-buying.In order to solve the problem of uneven utility distribution in the group-buying coalition,the subsection utility distribution mechanism and the truthful payment mechanism based on the coalition formed by the max-utility of coalition and the max-deal of coalition are proposed here.In the subsection distribution mechanism,the buyer’s utility is proportional to its contribution to the coalition.In the truthful contribution payment mechanism,the cost of each buyer is its contribution to the coalition.The theoretical analysis reveals individual rationality,budget-balance,truthful and fairness of the two mechanisms.Experimental results show that the self-protection pricing function satisfies the nature of the increasing of the seller’s income and can guarantees that the seller’s income does not decease with the increase of the goods selling.


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Last Update: 2017-09-30