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Auction and pricing for advertising based on synonymous keywords(PDF)


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Auction and pricing for advertising based on synonymous keywords
Yin Weihua12Zhou Zhiwei2
1.Finance Section; 2.School of Information Engineering,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China
synonymous keywords advertising auction pricing search engines revenues
F713.359; F713.8
A synonymous keyword auction mechanism for advertising(SKAMA)is put forward to improve the revenue of search engines.The value of each keyword is defined by the search engine according to its searching frequency,the roles of the keyword and its synonyms and near-synonyms in searching.An advertising allocation algorithm based on the 0-1 matrix and a payment algorithm based on generalized second-price auction are designed according to the economic properties of the offer authenticity,overall return effectiveness and individual rationality.The SKAMA is compared with the existing keyword auction.The experimental results show that,SKAMA can significantly improve the utilization of advertising resource and increase the revenue of search engine service while ensuring that advertisers are allocated advertising resources.


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Last Update: 2017-12-31