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Game analysis of university-industry coordinated innovation based on technique spillovers(PDF)


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Game analysis of university-industry coordinated innovation based on technique spillovers
Su Zhou
Development and Research Center,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China
coordinated innovation technology spillovers university-industry collaboration stability game theory
N94; O225
In order to investigate the stability and performance of University-Industry collaboration innovation with technique spillover,the paper constructes the game model of the university-industry coordinated innovation based on technique spillovers by using game theory. It also analyzes the model by mathematical analysis and numerical simulation. The results show that technology spillovers,motivation factor and the coordinated effect coefficient all have positive effects on stability and performance of university-industry collaboration innovation model,and it can promote coordinated innovation from coordinated innovation system and the government actions by the measures.


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Last Update: 2018-02-28