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Combinatorial bilateral auction mechanism for group buying(PDF)


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Combinatorial bilateral auction mechanism for group buying
Sun Maosheng12Zhu Zhengnan3Zhu Junwu3Wang Jiandong1
1.College of Computer Science and Technology,Nanjing University of Aeronauticsand Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China; 2.Information Construction and Management Center,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China; 3.School of Information Engineering,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China
group buying combination bilateral auction allocation pricing unit difference
A real combinatorial bilateral auction mechanism for group buying is designed for cloud resource allocation and spectrum auction. The concept of unit difference is introduced to determine a winner buyer in the group purchase mechanism. Unit difference is the difference between total bids,needs of buyers and corresponding sellers’ total costs of unit commodity. In the process of selecting a winner buyer,the seller with the minimum matching cost is directly selected as the winner seller. The buyers’ payment is calculated by using the unit difference of overlapping buyers and two-price payment idea of Vickrey-Clark-Groves(VCG)mechanism,and distributed to sellers who want to match,thus avoiding the buyer from obtaining higher utility by reporting false information. Theoretical and simulation experiments show that this mechanism satisfies the economic attributes of individual rationality and budget balance.


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Last Update: 2018-12-30