[1]雷爱国,胡启洲,李慧慧,等.无信号交叉口过街行人与司机演化博弈行为研究[J].南京理工大学学报(自然科学版),2020,44(06):705-714.[doi:10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2020.44.06.010]
 Lei Aiguo,Hu Qizhou,Li Huihui,et al.Evolutionary game behavior between crossing pedestriansand drivers at unsignalized intersections[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology,2020,44(06):705-714.[doi:10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2020.44.06.010]
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无信号交叉口过街行人与司机演化博弈行为研究()
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《南京理工大学学报》(自然科学版)[ISSN:1005-9830/CN:32-1397/N]

卷:
44卷
期数:
2020年06期
页码:
705-714
栏目:
出版日期:
2020-12-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Evolutionary game behavior between crossing pedestriansand drivers at unsignalized intersections
文章编号:
1005-9830(2020)06-0705-10
作者:
雷爱国胡启洲李慧慧林娟娟
南京理工大学 自动化学院,江苏 南京 210094
Author(s):
Lei AiguoHu QizhouLi HuihuiLin Juanjuan
School of Automation,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing 210094,China
关键词:
无信号交叉口 过街行人 司机 演化博弈 人工计数法 视频计数法
Keywords:
unsignalized intersection crossing pedestrians drivers evolutionary game manual counting method video counting method
分类号:
U491.1
DOI:
10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2020.44.06.010
摘要:
为了缓解无信号交叉口过街行人和司机冲突,对过街行人和司机进行演化博弈分析,研究了博弈参数对博弈双方过街行为的影响。采用人工计数法和视频计数法,统计所选无信号交叉口过街行人的通过率和司机的礼让率,发现司机礼让率仅为51.96%。根据在斑马线前的等待时间将过街行人心理变化情况分为3个阶段,据此构建每个阶段过街行人与司机的博弈矩阵,对每个阶段的均衡点深入分析。MATLAB仿真表明:过街行人和司机演化博弈行为最终有2个演化稳定状态; 改变博弈参数的值,可以定向调整博弈双方的演化方向,能有效提高无信号交叉口过街行人安全。
Abstract:
In order to alleviate the conflict between pedestrians and drivers at unsignalized intersections,the evolutionary game analysis is carried out to study the influence of game parameters on the crossing behavior of both players. By using the manual counting method and video counting method,the passing proportion of pedestrians crossing the street and the courteous ratio of drivers at the selected unsignalized intersection are counted. It is found that the driver’s comity ratio is only 51.96%. According to the waiting time in front of the zebra crossing,the psychological changes of pedestrians are divided into three stages,and the game matrix between pedestrians and drivers in each stage is constructed,and the equilibrium point of each stage is analyzed in depth. MATLAB simulation shows that the evolutionary game behavior of pedestrians and drivers has two evolutionary stable states; changing the value of game parameters can adjust the evolutionary direction of both sides of the game,and effectively improve the pedestrian safety at unsignalized intersections.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2020-09-26 修回日期:2020-10-13
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(51178157); 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJAZH028); 交通运输部公路科学研究所智能交通技术交通运输行业重点实验室开放基金(201908); 江苏省“六大人才高峰”高层次人才项目(JXQC-021); 河南省重点科技攻关项目(182102310004)
作者简介:雷爱国(1995-),男,硕士生,主要研究方向:交通工程安全管理,E-mail:leiaiguo9601@163.com; 通讯作者:胡启洲(1975-),男,博士,副教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向:交通控制、智慧交通,E-mail:qizhouhu@163.com。
引文格式:雷爱国,胡启洲,李慧慧,等. 无信号交叉口过街行人与司机演化博弈行为研究[J]. 南京理工大学学报,2020,44(6):705-714.
投稿网址:http://zrxuebao.njust.edu.cn
更新日期/Last Update: 2020-12-30