[1]姜 艺,吴 静,朱泽宇,等.一种面向团购的分配与定价机制[J].南京理工大学学报(自然科学版),2017,41(05):602.[doi:10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2017.41.05.011]
 Jiang Yi,Wu Jing,Zhu Zeyu,et al.Allocation and pricing mechanism oriented to group-buying[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology,2017,41(05):602.[doi:10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2017.41.05.011]
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一种面向团购的分配与定价机制()
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《南京理工大学学报》(自然科学版)[ISSN:1005-9830/CN:32-1397/N]

卷:
41卷
期数:
2017年05期
页码:
602
栏目:
出版日期:
2017-10-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Allocation and pricing mechanism oriented to group-buying
文章编号:
1005-9830(2017)05-0602-08
作者:
姜 艺1吴 静1朱泽宇2朱俊武13李 斌14
1.扬州大学 信息工程学院,江苏 扬州225127; 2.广西师范学院 计算机与信息工程学院,广西 南宁 530023; 3.圭尔夫大学 计算机科学学院,加拿大 安大略 圭尔夫 N1G2W1; 4.南京大学 软件新技术国家重点实验室,江苏 南京 210023
Author(s):
Jiang Yi1Wu Jing1Zhu Zeyu2Zhu Junwu13Li Bin14
1.School of Information Engineering,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China; 2.School of Computer and Information Engineering,Guangxi Teachers Education University,Nanning 530023,China; 3.School of Computer Science,University of Guelph,Guelph N1G2W1,Canada; 4.State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China
关键词:
团购 定价函数 联盟 定价机制 收益分配
Keywords:
group-buying pricing function coalition pricing mechanism utility distribution
分类号:
TP399
DOI:
10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2017.41.05.011
摘要:
在团购中,对商品有不同数量需求的买家可以通过形成一个具有共同利益的联盟来增强与商家的谈判协商能力。为了解决在团购联盟内买家收益分配不均的问题,该文在最大化联盟收益和最大化联盟成交量两种不同联盟形成方案的基础上,提出了分段式的买家收益分配机制和真实报价的贡献支付机制。其中分段式分配机制能够根据买家的报价进行分段,使得买家获得的收益与其为联盟的贡献度成正比,贡献支付机制中买家实际支付的费用是其对联盟的贡献。从理论上分析了两种机制能够同时满足个体理性、预算平衡、真实报价和公平性等的良好属性。实验结果表明,该文提出的自保护定价函数满足了卖家收益单调递增的性质,保证了卖家的收益不会随卖出商品数量的增大而减少。
Abstract:
Buyers with different requirements can enhance their ability with sellers by forming a common-utility coalition in group-buying.In order to solve the problem of uneven utility distribution in the group-buying coalition,the subsection utility distribution mechanism and the truthful payment mechanism based on the coalition formed by the max-utility of coalition and the max-deal of coalition are proposed here.In the subsection distribution mechanism,the buyer’s utility is proportional to its contribution to the coalition.In the truthful contribution payment mechanism,the cost of each buyer is its contribution to the coalition.The theoretical analysis reveals individual rationality,budget-balance,truthful and fairness of the two mechanisms.Experimental results show that the self-protection pricing function satisfies the nature of the increasing of the seller’s income and can guarantees that the seller’s income does not decease with the increase of the goods selling.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2016-10-08 修回日期:2017-03-15

基金项目:国家自然科学基金(61472344; 61170201); 江苏省前瞻性科技项目(BY2015061-06; BY2015061-08)
作者简介:姜艺(1974-),女,硕士,副教授,主要研究方向:人工智能及机制设计,E-mail:jiangyi@yzu.edu.cn; 通讯作者:朱俊武(1972-),男,博士,教授,主要研究方向:人工智能、算法博弈论及本体论等,E-mail:jwzhu@yzu.edu.cn。
引文格式:姜艺,吴静,朱泽宇,等.一种面向团购的分配与定价机制[J].南京理工大学学报,2017,41(5):602-609.
投稿网址:http://zrxuebao.njust.edu.cn
更新日期/Last Update: 2017-09-30