[1]孙茂圣,朱正楠,朱俊武,等.面向团购的组合双边拍卖机制[J].南京理工大学学报(自然科学版),2018,42(06):700.[doi:10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2018.42.06.010]
 Sun Maosheng,Zhu Zhengnan,Zhu Junwu,et al.Combinatorial bilateral auction mechanism for group buying[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology,2018,42(06):700.[doi:10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2018.42.06.010]
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面向团购的组合双边拍卖机制()
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《南京理工大学学报》(自然科学版)[ISSN:1005-9830/CN:32-1397/N]

卷:
42卷
期数:
2018年06期
页码:
700
栏目:
出版日期:
2018-12-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Combinatorial bilateral auction mechanism for group buying
文章编号:
1005-9830(2018)06-0700-07
作者:
孙茂圣12朱正楠3朱俊武3王建东1
1.南京航空航天大学 计算机科学与技术学院,江苏 南京 211106; 2.扬州大学 信息化建设与管理中心,江苏 扬州 225127; 3.扬州大学 信息工程学院,江苏 扬州 225127
Author(s):
Sun Maosheng12Zhu Zhengnan3Zhu Junwu3Wang Jiandong1
1.College of Computer Science and Technology,Nanjing University of Aeronauticsand Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China; 2.Information Construction and Management Center,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China; 3.School of Information Engineering,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China
关键词:
团购 组合双边拍卖 分配 定价 单位差
Keywords:
group buying combination bilateral auction allocation pricing unit difference
分类号:
TP399
DOI:
10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2018.42.06.010
摘要:
针对云资源分配和频谱拍卖资源分配定价问题,该文设计了面向团购的真实组合双边拍卖机制。引入了单位差的概念,通过单位差的值决定赢者买家。单位差表现了买家总竞价和需求对应的卖家的总成本在每单位商品上的差别。在筛选赢者买家过程中直接选定与之匹配的最小成本的卖家作为赢者卖家。通过VCG(Vickrey-Clark-Groves)二价支付思想使用重叠买家的单位差计算买家的支付,并分摊交付于想匹配的卖家,避免了买家通过虚假报告信息获得更高的效用。理论分析和模拟实验表明,该文机制满足个体理性、预算平衡的经济属性。
Abstract:
A real combinatorial bilateral auction mechanism for group buying is designed for cloud resource allocation and spectrum auction. The concept of unit difference is introduced to determine a winner buyer in the group purchase mechanism. Unit difference is the difference between total bids,needs of buyers and corresponding sellers’ total costs of unit commodity. In the process of selecting a winner buyer,the seller with the minimum matching cost is directly selected as the winner seller. The buyers’ payment is calculated by using the unit difference of overlapping buyers and two-price payment idea of Vickrey-Clark-Groves(VCG)mechanism,and distributed to sellers who want to match,thus avoiding the buyer from obtaining higher utility by reporting false information. Theoretical and simulation experiments show that this mechanism satisfies the economic attributes of individual rationality and budget balance.

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相似文献/References:

[1]姜 艺,吴 静,朱泽宇,等.一种面向团购的分配与定价机制[J].南京理工大学学报(自然科学版),2017,41(05):602.[doi:10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2017.41.05.011]
 Jiang Yi,Wu Jing,Zhu Zeyu,et al.Allocation and pricing mechanism oriented to group-buying[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology,2017,41(06):602.[doi:10.14177/j.cnki.32-1397n.2017.41.05.011]

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2018-09-10 修回日期:2018-10-12
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(61872313); 江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划(KYCX18_2366); 扬州市科技计划(YZ2017288; YZ2016245); 扬州大学江都高端装备工程技术研究院开放课题(YDJD201707)
作者简介:孙茂圣(1971-),男,博士生,高级工程师,主要研究方向:信息安全、智能数据分析等,E-mail:mssun@yzu.edu.cn; 通讯作者:王建东(1944-),男,教授,主要研究方向:信息安全、人工智能,E-mail:aics@nuaa.edu.cn。
引文格式:孙茂圣,朱正楠,朱俊武,等. 面向团购的组合双边拍卖机制[J]. 南京理工大学学报,2018,42(6):700-706.
投稿网址:http://zrxuebao.njust.edu.cn
更新日期/Last Update: 2018-12-30